Asked whether the US had an obligation to defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China, Mr Bush replied: "Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes I would. Pressed whether that would involve "the full force of American military", the president said he would use "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself". Later, in his AP interview, Mr Bush said that the use of force in such circumstances was "certainly an option", adding that "the Chinese have got to understand that is clearly an option".
Mr Bush used similar language a third time when he was interviewed on CNN just before leaving on a trip to Louisiana. This time, however, he also warned Taiwan not to interpret his willingness to intervene as any kind of encouragement for a declaration of independence. We'll work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn't happen.
We need a peaceful resolution of this issue. Mr Bush went out of his way to claim that his remarks were not a change in US policy. The result, as shall be seen, was a debacle. President George W. Like the Clinton administration before it, the Bush administration was predominantly of the opinion that Beijing was progressing gradually but purposefully toward economic liberalization, thanks to the impetus of WTO membership. There was great confidence in that.
Nowhere was this forbearance toward China more consequential than in the matter of pedestal actuators—mechanisms that adjust the height of seats on motorized scooters used by the physically disabled. In August , a New Jersey maker of pedestal actuators that had lost a substantial amount of business to Chinese imports decided to strike back using the law. This was the first effort to use a special kind of safeguard tariff that applied only to China.
American manufacturers could get temporary duties or other protective measures levied on competing Chinese goods alone if the U. In the pedestal actuators case, a finding of market disruption was forthcoming on Oct.
Explaining its decisions in these cases, the White House issued statements noting that under the law governing the China product-specific safeguard, the president is supposed to consider the overall impact on the U. Furthermore, even if the government blocked imports from China, similar products would soon come into the U. Omitted from these public statements were some of the deeper reasons for rejecting the use of the China safeguard. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, worried that if one industry got protection under the safeguard, virtually every U.
That would put the entire U. Also tilting the scales was lobbying by Chinese officials, who strenuously argued against U. The White House had no choice but to listen, given foreign-policy considerations such as securing Chinese support for its anti-terrorism campaigns.
In March , the president bowed to pressure from Rust Belt states by imposing tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on imported steel, including Chinese steel, using the general safeguard rules. But Bush resisted entreaties to come down harder on China—and he took considerable heat as a result. By remaining true to his convictions, Bush deserves credit for political courage.
That, in turn, might have blunted the impact of the China shock. Would such an approach have worked? Responding to intensified criticism in Congress, the new U. Policymakers at senior levels would convene twice a year for give-and-take on all manner of economic issues—not just hot-button trade, currency, and investment topics but also financial market opening, energy, the environment, and food and product safety.
Other Chinese-U. The Treasury chief wanted to include a large number of Chinese ministers and influential officials involved in economic matters, while also reserving time for brief engagement with the respective heads of state, Hu and Bush. The outcome can be described as incremental at best. The first session convened on Dec. Some specific so-called deliverables resulted, notably an agreement on air travel that more than doubled nonstop routes between the United States and China, a Chinese commitment on emissions trading, and a tourism promotion accord.
But U. Trade Representative at that time, told me. In any event, the Strategic Economic Dialogues were overtaken by other developments—in U. The talks were supposed to be two-way, with China having reciprocal rights to air its concerns about U. Amid the steady debilitation of other Wall Street firms, Paulson was peppered with questions from the Chinese about the health of U.
At the dialogue in Annapolis in June , Wang Qishan, who had known Paulson for 15 years and succeeded Wu as the head of the Chinese delegation, pulled the treasury secretary aside.
A showdown loomed when a board meeting was scheduled for Sept. The board meeting was never held. Indeed, the U. On Sept. The staggeringly large financial gyrations that ensued for months thereafter shifted the balance of power again away from the United States and toward China—this time seismically, by several orders of magnitude greater than anything that had come earlier in the crisis. In his chapters about events immediately following the Lehman bankruptcy, the former treasury secretary recounts numerous phone calls to Beijing in which he and other Treasury officials were essentially imploring Chinese leaders to help keep the rest of the U.
On the Saturday after Lehman collapsed, for example, Paulson called Wang in the hopes that a Chinese state-owned company would invest in the investment banking giant Morgan Stanley, which was in desperate need of a cash infusion. But now, many people have realized that it is nothing more than a fantasy. Both sojourned in China for extended periods and then, on the long road to the White House, spent their political careers in various senior capacities.
But while both men used their China experiences to brandish foreign policy credentials, further comparisons highlight the differences three-quarters of a century can have in geopolitics. Marines in the Boxer Rebellion. Bush to head up the new Liaison Office in Beijing, China had become unified under the Communist Party and was slowly beginning to reengage with the world.
Throughout his professional career, Bush remained connected to China and its leaders. For one prominent Chinese official—who sat one spot down from President Xi Jinping at the G20 in Buenos Aires —this friendship cemented his career: Yang Jiechi parlayed his Bush family relationship to the commanding heights of the Politburo. But beyond the career advancement of a single Chinese diplomat, what the historical record shows is that in the Oval Office Bush was a realist who wanted to maintain personal ties to the Chinese leadership even as his energies shifted to focus on the historic events in Europe that ended the Cold War.
That commitment seemed to engender genuine affection. After the formal meeting, a smaller group moved over to the residence to discuss the public demonstrations erupting in several Chinese cities. On a return visit in December, this time announced while he was in Beijing, Scowcroft laid the groundwork for the resumption of bilateral ties that Bush believed was in the interests of people on both sides of the Pacific.
Skip to main content. Did President George H. Bush Mishandle China? A ChinaFile Conversation.
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