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If Realpolitik is defined too narrowly, then noting its relative infrequency is no feat at all and says little about foreign policy or international relations. The definition should be elastic enough to be uncontroversial, making it acceptable to those working within the many different strains of realism, but also expansive enough to serve as a difficult test for my argument.
In particular, we are looking for a conception that is consistent with both classical and structural realism, a common distinction in the literature.
While both schools of realism agree that international relations take place in a dangerous environment in which states might need to resort to violence to achieve their objectives, proponents of both schools base this belief on assumptions at different levels of analysis. Classical realists ground their approach in what they see as humans' quest for power; structural realists ground their approach in the uniquely anarchic nature of the system in which nation-states interact. Conceivably, I could simply look for how prominent realists have defined Realpolitik in their writings and find a common denominator.
But although there have been many efforts to define the principles of realism, I find virtually no mention of what constitutes Realpolitik. Realpolitik is a German term, first used in the s, whose etymology suggests a way forward. For the purposes of this article, I define Realpolitik as the egoistic pursuit of the national interest under largely material structural constraints. The definition seems unobjectionable, perhaps even trivial.
However, from this spare and simple premise—that states think only of themselves but must operate in a largely unregulated environment where others are doing the same—can be deduced all the other phenomena that have come to be identified with realism, of which two are perhaps most important. First, power is indispensable, and the ultima ratio of military force always lurks in the background.
The dangerous nature of international politics is such that states must look out for themselves first, and this requires that they do things—most notably, use violence—that would be morally unacceptable in other political contexts. It is not that realists have no commitment to principles. On the contrary. Realists therefore expect that states either do not or should not apply typical liberal ethical norms, such as the nonviolent resolution of conflicts, to their international conduct.
There is considerable debate among realists about what constitutes egoistic behavior. Do states seek to maximize power or security? Are they perhaps even driven by other goals, such as honor and status? Despite these differences, realist scholars agree that states are largely self-regarding. Regardless, foreign policy is self-centered. Even motivations such as pride are self-regarding. This commonality explains realist resistance to claims that national interests can be constrained by international norms or international organizations.
Claims of state egoism are most common in classical realism, which makes sense given its grounding in assumptions about human nature. In this way, structural realists do not offer an exclusively systemic theory of international relations, because their arguments rest on generally explicit assumptions about the wants of states. There is no security competition if states are not self-regarding, and the more expansive their egoistic impulses, the more dangerous the international environment.
In other words, self-interest on the part of states, an attribute of units, is necessary to generate the systemic pressures of anarchy. As Alexander Wendt has illuminated conceptually, a state system comprising other-regarding units would not generate the dynamics that realists presuppose.
Just as all realists assume that states are egoistic, they also make reference to the importance of structural constraints.
The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future.
For many classical realists, the structural constraint was the egoism of other states rather than the absence of a supranational coercive authority.
The most important constraint in international relations is, of course, the distribution of power. Thus, for all the important distinctions between the classical and structural realist traditions, each needs the insights of the other to make its approach whole. Classical realism relies implicitly and sometimes even explicitly on the permissive cause of anarchy to generate power political dynamics, and structural realism relies again often implicitly on an egoistic theory of state motivation rooted in assumptions about the units.
Realpolitik brings them together. The pursuit of egoistic interests in light of structural constraints is the very definition of instrumental rationality.
As mentioned before, realism rests on a utilitarian moral logic in which the ends justify the means. Therefore, instrumental rationality, exercised on behalf of the state's interest, is part of the essence of Realpolitik. The status of the rationality assumption in realist theory is contested, however, dividing structural realists in particular. In using this systemic logic, Waltz is arguing that the international environment incentivizes instrumental rationality, even if it cannot compel it.
All neorealists agree on the incentives for states to act in an instrumentally rational manner i. Threat focuses the mind. Classical realists seem to be more unified than structural realists concerning the necessity of instrumental rationality in Realpolitik. This is rational thought or reason and does not need to be applied to securing egoistic ends, or any ends at all.
Scientists study the stars using procedural rationality simply to understand them, not to outmaneuver them in a bargaining setting. But, when procedural rationality is combined with egoism, the result is the strategic and calculating thinking that is essential to Realpolitik. Realists are not telling leaders just what to think; they are telling them how to think. As mentioned, rational thought has two core components—objectivity and deliberation.
Structural constraints have to be perceived, which requires an accurate evaluation of the environment. Alternative courses of action must be considered and judged according to an estimation of their consequences, which requires active deliberation. Realist arguments are as much about cognitive style as they are about empirical substance. Objectivity is central.
To promote one's interests, one might have to sacrifice one's principles, for instance. The statesman must also separate vital interests from peripheral ones and jettison the latter. One chooses the lesser evil. Representing a reaction against the wish dreams … realism is liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. Rational thinking is cold and unemotional. He should also seek, quite coolly and rationally, to ascertain the practical interest of the State, and to separate these from any emotional overtones—for hatred and revenge … are bad counsellors in politics.
The realist focus on objectivity and deliberation is deeply psychological. Thinking is a core aspect of Realpolitik, as is evident from the syntax of classical realist texts. As the above passages indicate, classical realism also has a distinctly normative and prescriptive character. This reality is not comprised of what individuals and states actually do out there but rather of the forces that determine what types of policies will be successful and what types of policies will fail.
This normative character of realism reveals that realists do not expect Realpolitik at all times. Rather, Realpolitik depends on the dispositional qualities of the state leader. Reviews of classical realism concur. The statesman has to objectively look those difficult truths in the face.
It is the nature of things that a theory of politics which is based upon such principles will not meet with unanimous approval—nor does, for that matter, such a foreign policy … The human mind in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look the truth of politics straight in the face. It must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish the truth—the more so, the more the individual is actively involved in the processes of politics, and particularly in those of international politics … Thus it is inevitable that a theory which tries to understand politics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would like to see it, must overcome a psychological resistance that most other branches of learning need not face.
Are the classical realists right? Is rational thinking a precondition for Realpolitik? Is Realpolitik therefore a function of the psychology of state leaders? And is rationality, and therefore Realpolitik, as rare as Morgenthau suggests? Classical realist assumptions are based on sweeping generalizations with no real attention to substantiation. Cognitive psychologists, however, have reached strikingly similar conclusions. Rational thought is rare, as we rely primarily on cognitive systems that are unconscious, intuitive, and emotional.
This is thought to be the system that guides most of our daily lives, only infrequently overridden by System II processing. The latter is deliberative, effortful, reflective, systematic, analytic, conscious, and explicit. It is what one generally thinks of as procedurally rational in nature. Every individual utilizes both systems. Both are part of our neural architecture as human beings. System II processing is sometimes called in to check on and override our System I judgments.
It is generally thought, however, that most tasks in our lives involve little such conscious and deliberate thinking. Procedural rationality is marked by both greater objectivity and deliberation, the same attributes of rational thought stressed by classical realists.
Not coincidentally, these elements are the opposites of, or at least opposed to, the two phenomena of which critics of rational choice make such frequent use—biases and heuristics.
The truth is often painful. Therefore, it is not surprising that psychologists have consistently uncovered ways in which individuals, even those in their field of expertise, choose to believe their own subjective truths despite evidence to the contrary.
Procedural rationality is also deliberative. As opposed to impulsively and reflexively made choices, rational thinking necessitates considered and therefore more time-consuming scrutiny. For objective analysis, we substitute biased views. For deliberation, we substitute heuristics that simplify our decisionmaking tasks. Rational thinking, it should be stressed, is not something judged by its success. That would be akin to ascribing irrationality to the gambler who bets on black when the roulette ball falls on red.
Whether rational thinking yields better outcomes is an open empirical question. Rationality is something we assess based on its inputs, not its outputs—that is, by the cognitive style that guides our decisionmaking. Psychological research also shows that individuals differ in the degree to which rational thought guides their decisionmaking. In other words, commitment to procedural rationality is a dispositional variable.
Those with greater epistemic motivation deliberate harder and are more committed to developing an objective understanding of their environment. They continue to collect and process information after making judgments, remaining open-minded. Consequently, they do not fall prey as easily to the heuristics and biases that psychologists have used to undermine the rationality assumption in economics.
How we think is as important as what we think. There is significant evidence that those who have greater epistemic motivation are more likely to behave in an instrumentally rational fashion.
One cannot act in a calculating, strategic, instrumentally rational manner if he or she does not consciously consider the environment and deliberate in an objective way. Stanovich and colleagues have shown that those with higher epistemic motivation, captured largely with measures of cognitive closure and need for cognition, fall prey less frequently in laboratory experiments to the heuristics and biases so common to others.
Psychological research therefore offers reason to believe that rational thought, combined with an egoistic foreign policy orientation, is a precondition for Realpolitik, but also that Realpolitik will be rare because rationality is as well. Procedural rationality—most importantly, the commitment to objectivity and deliberation—will be associated with instrumental rationality presuming that statesmen are primarily interested in securing gains for their own countries, rather than for others which is not always true, as the empirical case below shows.
Rational thought is necessary for at least four instrumentally rational behaviors familiar to international relations theorists, although this list is not exhaustive. Below I describe each behavior, explain how it presupposes objectivity and deliberation, and note its historical association with realist thought. If decisionmakers are optimizing given constraints, they must consider the pluses and minuses of different courses of action in securing their goals.
Decisionmakers are also often forced to make choices between goals themselves. While a particular decision might sacrifice one aim, it might nevertheless be the right choice in terms of overall benefits. This type of behavior requires objectivity and deliberation. Statesmen must be honest with themselves, seeing things as they are, not as they wish them to be. One cannot have it all. Rather than a cognitively and integratively complex process, we often use simple evaluative rules—for instance, maximizing on one dimension rather than making trade-offs across several, or deontological thinking in which we consider only one factor regardless of the consequences.
Decisionmakers might have identical preferences. But if they have different cognitive styles, they might nevertheless make different choices. Instrumentally rational statecraft guided by objective and deliberative thinking is situational. One does what is best given the circumstances, which are constantly changing.
Circumstances are infinite, are infinitely combined; are variable and transient; he who does not take them into consideration is not erroneous, but stark mad … A statesman … is to be guided by circumstances; and judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin his country forever. Only by evaluating the situation coolly and dispassionately, seeing it as it truly is, can one make the choice that is best for oneself in the long term.
Long-term thinking is a consistent theme in realist scholarship. Playing the long game is not easy, however. Long-term thinking often requires restraint and short-term sacrifices for long-term gains.
Instrumental rationality in situations of interdependence requires judging and anticipating the actions of others. It necessitates that they recognize that others' behavior might be a product of a situation, not an inherent disposition, the latter being the cognitively easier and emotionally more comforting conclusion. How can scholars test my claim, inspired by classical realist insights and modern cognitive psychology, that rational thought is necessary for Realpolitik and that both are rare elements in foreign policy?
A systematic inventory of all state leaders and their psychological attributes is prohibitively time-consuming and arguably impossible. Data sets of individual leader attributes are generally limited to easily identifiable characteristics such as age in office, profession, or military background. My solution is to focus on a historical example that should prove a hard case for my argument and an easy one for the ubiquity of realism.
By the logic of structural realism, even the claims of those such as Waltz who do not believe that the system can predict foreign policy behavior, Realpolitik should be most prevalent and likely in situations in which countries face significant external threats and are particularly physically and militarily vulnerable.
One should also select a non-American example, given that the United States is argued to have an exceptional foreign policy and political culture hostile to realism, perhaps as the result of having two oceans as borders. I choose the case of Prussia before and during the period of German unification. Prussia was the weakest of the five great powers, militarily exposed on multiple sides with no natural geographic features to protect it.
Indeed, the German historian Otto Hintze long ago argued that Prussia's environmental constraints were reflected in its domestic institutions.
Authoritarian government was necessary for Prussia to respond quickly to external threats. The norms of the Concert of Europe that had softened the edges of power politics had deteriorated with the onset of the Crimean War in The most important political figure in this period was Otto von Bismarck, who served as a loyal adviser to his Prussian king, Wilhelm I, for decades.
As is well known, Bismarck was a political realist. I demonstrate how his realism owed to his rational thinking a psychological variable and distinguished him from his political peers and allies. The contrast with his domestic counterparts is particularly important, as it allows me to more precisely identify the effect of individual-level characteristics while controlling for other variables. Were I to compare Bismarck to an international contemporary such as Napoleon III or a German successor such as Gustav Stresemann, other features of the external situation would change, making it impossible to identify the precise effect of Bismarck's epistemic motivation or the uniqueness of Bismarck's Realpolitik.
Even though leaders such as Wilhelm I faced the same severe international structural constraints perhaps even greater ones given his ultimate responsibility , only Bismarck responded to them in a realist fashion. Bismarck was one of the world's great realist statesmen. He embraced many of the substantive views associated with the realist theoretical tradition. Yet, these traditional realist views do not do justice to the sophistication of Bismarck's Realpolitik, missing in particular the rational quality of his cognitive style—that is, his epistemic motivation.
This section explores Bismarck's foreign policy egoism, his commitment to objectivity and deliberation, and shows how this combination led naturally to an instrumentally rational foreign policy approach that scholars call Realpolitik. Bismarck was a Prussian, not a German, egoist. In regards to the circumstances of all other lands, I recognize no kind of principled commitment for the policy of a Prussian.
I regard policy solely by the measure of its usefulness for Prussian goals. In my view, the duty of a Prussian monarchy is limited to the borders of the Prussian empire drawn by God. Bismarck instead had strong conservative political principles; he was a genuine believer in a God-given hierarchical order of divine right, monarchical rule, and aristocratic privilege. These principles were under threat in his time, a threat brought home by the democratic revolutions that swept Europe and, in , led to the grudging promulgation of a constitution in Prussia.
Almost all observers of Bismarck comment on his epistemic motivation. Bismarck's foreign affairs egoism and epistemic motivation led him to adopt naturally to a utilitarian, consequentialist, instrumentally rational approach to politics. Prussia must do its best in light of the structural circumstances it faced. His Realpolitik was rare. Historians agree. As politics and life in general was full of obstacles and constraints, Bismarck stressed the necessity of navigating them as best possible.
This is the definition of instrumental rationality. Politicians must be content with what was possible and not overplay their hand in the pursuit of the ideal. In Bismarck, one sees all of the four manifestations of instrumentally rational foreign policy mentioned above: utility maximization, situational judgments, long-term thinking, and strategic understanding. Bismarck consistently emphasized the importance of adapting to each situation.
He must observe or seek out every favorable opportunity to implement what seems to him correct and appropriate for the fatherland's interests … A governing program that applies to all times cannot exist because the times change. The professors and their imitators in the newspapers constantly decry the fact that I have not revealed a set of principles by which I directed my policies.
Because they have as yet scarcely outgrown the political nursery, the Germans cannot accustom themselves to regard political affairs as a study of the possible. The goals and strategies of opponents were key elements of the situation with which leaders had to contend. As an egoist pursuing only Prussia's interest, Bismarck saw his country as engaged in strategic interaction with others.
Bismarck's structural understanding of politics and foreign policy led him to stress the importance of seizing opportunities when the circumstances were favorable, given that these could not easily be re-created.
No, it advances by fits and starts, but with irresistible force when it does. One must just be permanently on the look-out and, when one sees God striding through history, leap in and catch hold of his coat-tail and be dragged along as far as may be. Seizing opportunities required farsightedness and the acceptance of short-term costs for long-term gains. He must be able to wait until the right moment has come and must precipitate nothing, no matter how great the temptation. If man takes the most beautiful pastry out of the fire too early, it collapses.
In the previous section, I argued that Bismarck's psychology was a precondition for his Realpolitik. This instrumentally rational type of foreign policy is predicated on both egoism and epistemic motivation. Below I show that this combination and its foreign policy consequences differentiated Bismarck from others in his country, even from those with whom he shared similar political interests.
His conservative peers and allies objected to his narrowly Prussian focus. In addition, they exhibited a different, less rational cognitive style that led them to different conclusions even when they all shared common goals. It was as a strident conservative opponent of the liberal opposition in the late s that Bismarck made a name for himself in Prussian politics.
Bismarck was also active within the Kreuzzeitung Party, named after the newspaper that served as a mouthpiece for reactionary and conservative ideas. Owing to these activities, in Bismarck became the Prussian envoy to the German Bund, a somewhat shocking appointment for a political novice, as it put him at the center of German affairs and interaction with Prussia's rival—Austria.
Bismarck owed his early political opportunities to the domestic views he shared with conservatives, but foreign policy would drive a wedge between him and his conservative friends.
Stationed in Frankfurt, Bismarck developed his belief that Austria was Prussia's primary competitor and its primary obstacle in reaching Prussia's potential as a great power. War was not necessarily foreordained, but for Bismarck, the only other possibility was an agreement on zones of influence. The other obstacle to Prussia's aims of greater influence in Germany, particularly Bismarck's desire for Prussia to be the cornerstone of a unified German state excluding Austria, were the smaller German states.
Bismarck's views on Austria and Germany caused severe frictions and ultimately destroyed his relationships with his conservative patrons. Austria, as well as Russia, were fellow members of the Holy Alliance, dedicated to the preservation of monarchical rule and the repression of democracy and liberalism since The fear of liberal revolution and the forces of nationalism persisted well past , given liberal and nationalist movements in France and Italy, among others.
Bismarck's realism put him at odds with the camarilla and the Kreuzzeitung because of both its egoism and its deliberative quality, something Bismarck frequently acknowledged and lamented. Whereas the romantic conservatives were reluctant to interfere with what they regarded as the legitimate rule of fellow monarchical powers, feeling a bond with them that extended past Prussia's borders, Bismarck had no such compunction.
We protect foreign monarchical rights with greater tenacity than our own … to the point of utter blindness to all the dangers to which Prussia's and Germany's independence is exposed as long as the madness of the present federal constitution [the Bund] survives.
I am loyal to my king to the end, but toward others I feel … not a trace of commitment to lift a finger for them. Bismarck's issues with his colleagues were not only substantive, reducible to varying degrees of foreign policy egoism. They were also cognitive, owing to a different and more rational way of thinking. The romantic conservatives viewed their alliance against democracy and liberalism as a matter of principle that could not be compromised, regardless of the consequences.
The Gerlachs and other romantic conservatives made decisions in a deontological fashion, whereas Bismarck was a utilitarian. This difference in cognitive style is first evident in Bismarck's personal dispute with Leopold von Gerlach over the Bund envoy's suggestion to invite Napoleon for a state visit to Berlin. Napoleon, however, was an illegitimate ruler and persona non grata to Prussian conservatives, so even such a parlay was wholly unacceptable.
You play with the idea of an alliance with France and Piedmont, a possibility, a thought, that for me lies far away as it should be, dear Bismarck, for you. Even though Bismarck and Gerlach shared a set of ethical concerns—namely, a commitment to conservative, anti-revolutionary principles—they preferred different policies as a result of their different degrees of rational thinking. Although for the moment, Bismarck continued to count the conservatives as his political allies, his realism left him without a political home.
His anti-revolutionary ideals angered liberals; his foreign policy views were anathema to conservatives. It is striking that the great foreign policy realist had no real consistent political allies. Bismarck's Realpolitik was rare, despite the severe international constraints under which his country was operating.
All historians seem to agree on this point. They cut him off from the various political groups and their respective ideals and convictions … It turned him, in other words, even in the years of his greatest success, into a lone wolf. Fundamentally he has no party. At every point during the s, Bismarck seemed to be alone in his views.
During the Crimean and Franco-Austrian wars, he advocated taking advantage of Austrian preoccupations. As explained above, if Realpolitik is the norm rather than the exception in foreign policy, then one should rarely see an isolated and lonely realist in practice. Pay based on use. Does my organisation subscribe? Group Subscription. Premium Digital access, plus: Convenient access for groups of users Integration with third party platforms and CRM systems Usage based pricing and volume discounts for multiple users Subscription management tools and usage reporting SAML-based single sign-on SSO Dedicated account and customer success teams.
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